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 It is my great pleasure and honor to be here at this symposium 
honoring Professor Hungdah Chiu. Yesterday, I learned a great deal 
from Professor Cohen‘s insightful remarks and the two panels this 
morning were also highly educational. I feel my trip to this 
conference is definitely worth it. 
Indeed, Professor Hungdah Chiu was our teacher, our good 
friend and mentor; he was also a good husband and a good father. But 
from where I came from, many think he was not only all of the above, 
but a phenomenon unto himself. He exerted enormous influence on 
the course of Taiwan‘s development, including cross-strait relations 
and its relationship to U.S. policy. For centuries, knowledge has been 
speaking to power in this and other countries. Many people have 
done that and many more will continue to do so. The reason why 
Professor Chiu stood out so prominently was because his ideas 
appeared at the right time and right place.  
His influence began in Taiwan in the 1980s and heightened in 
the 1990s, an era of great transformation in Taiwan and in the world. 
When the Tiananmen incident occurred in 1989, it changed China 
and shook the world.1 Then the Soviet Union collapsed suddenly, 
completely, and peacefully in 1991 and that changed the world, too. 
The United States became the only superpower and the global 
strategic picture was altered. During the 80s and 90s, Taiwan matured 
enough economically and socially to democratize.2 People the world 
 
† Ph.D., Columbia University. The author is chairman of Taipei Forum and professor at the 
Graduate Institute of China Studies, Tamkang University. The following is an edited version of 
the author‘s remarks delivered as part of China, Taiwan, and International Law: A Symposium in 
Honor of Professor Hungdah Chiu on October 5, 2011 at the University of Maryland Francis King 
Carey School of Law. 
 1. See SU CHI, TAIWAN‘S RELATIONS WITH MAINLAND CHINA: A TAIL WAGGING TWO 
DOGS 26 (2009) (noting ―the isolation of the PRC after the Tiananmen incident‖).  
 2. Id. at 3.  
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over applauded our democratization as a new Third Wave model.3 
But the flip side of democratization in Taiwan is it let the genie out of 
the bottle. So, Taiwan was no longer an authoritarian regime, but 
democratization also entails that many fingers could henceforth pull 
the trigger. Being the only place that could drag the United States and 
China into war, Taiwan has since become the tail that wagged two 
dogs.4 
For two decades, Professor Chiu tirelessly preached the value of 
democracy and democratization to Taiwan. He was the leading voice 
urging the ending of the martial law, constitutional reform, and 
flexible diplomacy. He also talked about democracy and human 
rights in mainland China. No less important, he was a forceful 
advocate of moderation in cross-strait relations. Until the late 1980s, 
there was so little relationship between Taiwan and mainland China 
that the term ―cross-strait relations‖ did not even exist.5 Thanks in 
part to Professor Chiu a new term, in Chinese haixia liangan guanxi, 
and its English translation, ―cross-straits relations,‖ were coined. 
Let me quickly recount what I thought were Professor Chiu‘s 
major contributions to the vital field of cross-strait relations. He put 
forward the idea of ―mutual non-denial‖ of the two sides of the Strait 
as a ―political entity.‖ Until then—in fact, even now—neither the 
People‘s Republic of China nor the Republic of China recognized 
each other as a ―country.‖ Yet people-to-people exchanges began to 
flourish in the late 1980s and there was an increasing need for 
government-to-government contacts to resolve problems arising from 
those interactions. To legitimize the interaction between them, 
Professor Chiu proposed that while neither would recognize each 
other as a ―country,‖ both could interact on the basis of not denying 
each other as a ―political entity.‖ By now, as some of you may know, 
this is a pet theme for President Ma Ying-jeou in Taipei.6 Professor 
 
 3. The Third Wave Model refers to the transitions to democracies in the late Twentieth 
Century. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE 
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991).  
 4. See generally SU CHI, supra note 1.  
 5. Id. at 1 (noting that November 2, 1987 ―is generally considered as the beginning of the 
current cross-strait relations‖ and that ―[f]or 38 years prior to that, Taiwan and mainland China 
had experienced only military conflict, diplomatic confrontation, and political struggle‖). 
 6. ‘Mutual Non-denial’ Remains, Ma says, TAIPEI TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www. 
taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2008/04/06/2003408525. Additionally, on May 30, 2011, 
President Ma in an address to the audience at the Asia-Pacific regional conference of the 
International Law Association that, unlike ―mutual recognition‖ of East/West Germany and 
North/South Korea, the case of Mainland China and Taiwan is best characterized as ―mutual non-
recognition.‖ Ma Ying-jeou, President of the Republic of China, Opening Address at the 2011 
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Chiu also argued for ―ending of the hostilities‖ and this term was 
officially incorporated into President Jiang Zemin‘s ―Eight Points‖ 
statement in January 1995 in Beijing7 and President Lee Teng-hui‘s 
―Six Points‖ statement in April 1995.8 Professor Chiu also helped 
President Lee Teng-hui draft the National Unification Guidelines in 
the early 1990s.9 As the Cold War ended and democratization swept 
much of the Third World, Taiwan‘s smooth democratization and 
moderate China policy at the time were well received worldwide and 
particularly welcomed by the United States. This is why we are 
extremely grateful to Professor Chiu, who exemplified the best 
qualities of Confucian tradition and Western education.  
Speaking of the United States, please allow me to mention the 
Twin Oaks issue. Some of you may be familiar, and Professor Cohen 
may be more familiar than I am, with this episode. Before the 
normalization of the U.S.-China relationship in January 1979, the 
Twin Oaks had been the official residence of nine ambassadors of the 
Republic of China government.10 In the talks leading to normalization, 
Beijing demanded ownership of Twin Oaks and Taiwan resisted.11 
Professor Chiu dug out a number of important legal cases to support 
Taiwan‘s claim.12 Eventually he helped Taiwan and the United States 
out of this dilemma by working to add an amendment into the Taiwan 
 
International Law Association Asia-Pacific Regional Conference (May 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.cils.nccu.edu.tw/Opening%20Address%20of%20President%20Ma%20Ying-jeou.pdf. 
He also mentioned that the idea of ―mutual non-recognition‖ was incorporated into a 2001 
international law case book. Id. (citing LORI F. DAROSEH, LOUIS HENKIN, SEAN D. MURPHY & 
HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 343 (5th ed. 2008)). 
 7.  Jiang Zemin's Eight-point Proposal, BRIDGING THE STRAITS (Jan. 11, 2011, 5:26 PM), 
http://english.cri.cn/4426/2007/01/11/167@184028.htm.  
 8. See JEAN MARIE HENCKAERTS, THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW 
WORLD ORDER: LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS 227–28 (1996) (summarizing the six 
points).  
 9. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that the National Unification Guidelines (NUG) were 
passed on February 23, 1991 and were the guiding principle for the ―Lee administration‘s 
mainland policy‖). As its title suggests, the NUG set up a framework of a three-phase plan of 
eventual unification between China and Taiwan. See id.   
 10. The Republic of China’s (Taiwan) Twin Oaks Estate, OVERSEAS OFFICE REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (TAIWAN) (Feb. 23, 2008), http://www.taiwanembassy.org/us/content.asp?CuItem=11441. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), Yongyuan de Qiu Laoshi (永遠的丘老師) [My Mentor Forever, 
Prof. Chiu], in GUOJIFA LUNJI (國際法論集) [INTERNATIONAL ARTICLES IN COLLECTION IN 
HONOR OF THE SIXTY-FIFTH BIRTHDAY OF PROFESSOR HUNGDAH CHIU] 21, 21–23 (2001) 
(describing three incidents used by Professor Chiu: 1) a U.K. case, Civil Air Transport Inc. v. 
Central Air Transport Corp. (Hong Kong), [1952] UKPC 25; 2) another case describing how 
Canada terminated its relationship with Taiwan; and 3) Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 
U.S. 126 (1938)).  
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Relations Act, 13  with the kind assistance of some senators, 
specifically Bob Dole and Orrin Hatch, passed in April 1979 by the 
U.S. Congress.14 This act allowed Taiwan to retain Twin Oaks to this 
day.15 We in Taiwan are eternally grateful for his pivotal role in this 
important episode. 
Returning to cross-strait relations: after democratization, Taiwan 
began to play a role entirely out of proportion to its power. As of 
2010, Taiwan‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 1% of the world‘s 
GDP, the United States is about 20%; China‘s is about 14%; Japan‘s 
another 6%.16 So Taiwan is probably the only country in the world, 
other than South Korea, that is dealing with 40% of the world power 
with only 1% of its GDP. Because Taiwan is situated in the middle of 
the three great powers, whatever Taiwan does and says is always 
being watched jealously by all sides. Thus, the management of our 
relations with Japan, China, and the United States has always been 
very difficult. 
For the same reason, its key strategic location transformed 
Taiwan from an ―underdog‖ of the previous four decades into ―a tail 
wagging two dogs‖ in the 1990s and 2000s. By ―a tail wagging two 
dogs‖ I mean, for good or bad, Taiwan drove the policy agenda of the 
United States and China for most of the last two decades.17 
These two decades can be divided into four periods. Lee Teng-
hui was our president between 1988 and 2000.18 But his mainland 
policy was so different during his time that it had to be divided into 
two periods: the early Lee Teng-hui (1988–1995) and later Lee Teng-
hui (1995–2000).19 The third period belongs to President Chen Shui-
bian (2000–2008),20 and the fourth to President Ma Ying-jeou (2008 
 
 13. Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 
3301–16 (2006)). 
 14. Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), supra note 12, at 22.  
 15. Id. See also 22 U.S.C. § 3303(b) (preventing the invalidation of the Twin Oaks transfer by 
declaring that recognition, or non-recognition, of Taiwan did not affect property interests 
―heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan‖). 
 16. For a listing of country-specific GDPs, see Country Economic Reports & GDP Data, 
GLOBAL FIN. MAGAZINE, http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports.html#axzz1rHvcMN 
HJ (last visited Mar. 6, 2012).  
 17. See generally SU CHI, supra note 1. 
 18. Id. at xi, xvi.  
 19. Id. at 2.  
 20. Profile: Chen Shui-bian, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2012, 7:25 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/2172980.stm.  
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to present).21 Generally speaking, Taiwan drove the agenda in all of 
the four periods. In these four periods, cross-strait relations have five 
dimensions measured from ―hard to soft‖: military, international, 
political, economic, and cultural. 22  Generally, the military and 
international dimensions are ―hard‖ and the economic and cultural 
dimensions are ―soft.‖23 The political dimension could tilt either way. 
In the first period, all five dimensions of the relations ―were 
clearly at a level of ease.‖24 This was the golden years of Taiwan‘s 
existence in the last six decades. 25  During this period, Taiwan 
initiated almost everything and China almost always played along. 
For example, Taiwan held then, as now, that the two sides should be 
equal in status, even though China was much bigger.26 When it came 
to signing the four agreements concluded in Singapore in 1993, 
Taiwan insisted on equality in the seating arrangement and 
everything else. 27  As you know, in Chinese tradition the person 
sitting on the right side of the table is considered the more honorable 
than the one on the left.28 To show equality, Taiwan side proposed 
that the two venerable gentlemen who would sign the documents 
switch seats half of the time. 29  But the Chinese and Taiwanese 
delegations standing behind the gentlemen were so large that they 
had to remain in the same place.30 So, voilà, a funny picture—a very 
strange one that I would say is the climax of the Singapore meeting.31 
In half of the pictures taken, Mr. Koo Chen-fu of Taiwan and Mr. 
Wang Daohan of the mainland were seen sitting or standing in front 
of the other gentleman‘s wife and delegation.32 This is totally against 
common practice in the diplomatic world.33 And yet Taiwan insisted 
on playing this game and China agreed to play along. That was just a 
small sign of how Taiwan drove the agenda. 
 
 21. Andrew Higgins, Taiwan's Pro-China Chief Reelected, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2012, at 
A14.   
 22. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 278.  
 23. Id.  
 24. Id.   
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 16.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 17. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
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During the second period, the relationship went sour after Lee 
Teng-hui‘s visit to his alma mater, Cornell University in 1995, 34 
which angered Beijing so much that it fired several missiles toward 
the island‘s surrounding waters. 35  Taiwan continued to drive the 
agenda to a lesser extent, but we still managed to draw attention. For 
example, when I was the ministerial chairman of the Mainland 
Affairs Council in 1999, I was not aware when President Lee Teng-
hui made the surprise announcement of the so-called ―special state-
to-state relationship‖ between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.36 
That announcement shocked the world and brought Chinese jet 
fighters across the center line of the Taiwan Strait.37  
The third period was even worse. President Chen Shui-bian 
governed for eight years and cross-strait relations entered an 
unprecedented phase. While military confrontation and diplomatic 
competition went harder, the cultural and economic exchanges 
became ever more intimate.38 Bilateral trade tripled and the number 
of visits doubled in eight years. 39  Against Washington‘s advice, 
President Chen pushed for writing a new constitution for Taiwan, 
changing the name of the country, and holding a plebiscite to 
legitimize the moves.40 He even laid out a timetable for Taiwan‘s de 
jure independence. 41  And all these initiatives naturally drove the 
United States crazy and made China furious. 
In the fourth stage, President Ma Ying-jeou assumed the 
presidency in 2008.42 Taiwan‘s GDP in proportion to China‘s shrank 
from a little more than one-quarter in 2000 to less than one-tenth in 
2008. 43  But Taiwan continued to ―wag the dogs,‖ though in an 
 
 34. President Lee‘s incendiary remarks regarding Taiwan‘s status made during his trip 
dramatically altered the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland and also the relationship 
between China and the United States. For a more in depth discussion of the visit‘s significance, 
see id. at 30–51.  
 35. Id. at 34–35.  
 36. Id. at 52–53.  
 37. Id. at 70.  
 38. Id. at 140.  
 39. See id. at 172–75.  
 40. Id. at 214–16.  
 41. See id. at 217, 226. 
 42. Id. at 293.  
 43. China‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was $1.198 trillion in 2000 and $4.519 trillion in 
2008. By contrast, Taiwan‘s GDP in 2000 was merely $326 billion in 2000 and a little more than 
$400 billion in 2008. World Economic Outlook Database, INT‘L MONETARY FUND, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx (follow ―By Countries 
(country-level data)‖ hyperlink; then complete query by selecting China and Taiwan Province, 
selecting GDP measured in U.S. Dollars, and selecting the appropriate range of years). 
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entirely different direction. For instance, Taiwan said its fundamental 
policy is ―no unification, no independence, and no use of force.‖44 
China never protested. When Taiwan proposed that the two sides 
should resume negotiations on the basis of the term ―92 consensus,‖45 
China said yes.46 When Taiwan said both should talk on the principle 
of ―seeking commonalities and shelving differences,‖ China said yes 
again.47 When Taiwan said ―let‘s start with economic issues first, 
political issues later,‖ China said yes.48  After Taiwan proposed a 
―diplomatic truce,‖ the two sides have in deeds, though not in words, 
refrained from ―stealing each other‘s diplomatic allies.‖ 49  Taiwan 
initiated all these new policies, China agreed to every one of them, 
and the United States applauded all along with great relief.  
The relationship has gone so much better now that the seating 
arrangement is no longer an item for haggling. From 2008 on, during 
any and all ceremonies, the guest gets the more honorable right side 
and the host sits or stands on the left. The two sides also stopped 
arguing over the terminologies in the signed documents. In the 1990s, 
for the sake of equality, Taiwan and the mainland would avoid the 
use of either side‘s terminologies and strained to find a non-legal 
term instead.50 During 2008–2010 a new practice emerged. Each side 
would use its own preferred terminologies in its version (in 
traditional or simplified characters) of the 15 signed agreements. A 
parenthesis would immediately follow to indicate the other side‘s 
preferred usage. 
In signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) in 2010, a new problem arose.51 In Taiwan ―framework‖ is 
 
 44. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 295.  
 45. In 1992, Taiwan and Mainland China reached a rare compromise on the most difficult 
issue of sovereignty whereby both agreed to express the concept of ―one-China‖ verbally, but 
differed on its definition. In 2000 this compromise was renamed by the author as ―‘92 consensus.‖ 
And since 2008 the new term has served as the basis for cross-strait dialogue. See generally, 
―YIGE ZHONGGUO, GEZI BIAOSHU‖ GONGSHI DE SHISHI (―一個中國，各自表述‖共識的史實) 
[―ONE CHINA, WITH RESPECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS‖—A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
CONSENSUS OF 1992] (SU CHI (蘇起) & CHENG AN-KUO (郑安国), eds., 2002) [hereinafter 
CONSENSUS OF 1992].  
 46. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 295.  
 47. Id. at 15.   
 48. See Su Chi: Taiwan Makes a Play, China Takes a Hit, TAIWAN NEWS, Feb. 10, 2012, 
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1837674.  
 49. Kwei-Bo Huang, In Pursuit of Gradual Stabilization and Peace Dividends: Cross-Taiwan 
Strait Relations and Their Influence on the Asia Pacific, MD. SERIES CONTEMP. ASIAN STUD., no. 
3, 2011, at 1, 4.  
 50. See CONSENSUS OF 1992, supra note 45, at v.  
 51. Kwei-Bo Huang, supra note 49, at 9.  
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―jia-gou,‖ but for China ―framework‖ is ―kuang-jia.‖ If a parenthesis 
were added to the title of the agreement, that would not look too 
good. Finally it was agreed that a sentence be added to the very end 
of the ECFA: ―The different wording of the corresponding text of this 
Agreement shall carry the same meaning . . . .‖ 52  Hence, even 
linguistically things have improved. 
Also, you may be interested to know that one of the fifteen 
agreements signed was about judicial mutual assistance. 53  So our 
prosecutors, police, and coast guards could now talk to their 
counterparts on the phone and visit each other.54 As far as I know, 
few people complained; even the opposition party did not complain 
about this agreement, because it was generally seen as serving the 
best interest of the people.  
As shown above, Taiwan basically drove the agenda over the last 
twenty years. But I would hasten to note the differences between the 
first soft period in the ‗90s, when Professor Chiu made the greatest 
contribution, and the current soft period with President Ma in power. 
There are, however, five major differences between that first soft 
period and today. The first difference is the worsening power balance 
for Taiwan, as mentioned earlier. In the early ‗90s, the power ratio 
measured in GDP was 1:2. 55  Now three provinces (Guandong, 
Shandong, and Jiangsu) surpass Taiwan.56 Second, as a corollary, the 
PRC‘s role in the region and the world is much larger than before. 
Third, there are closer economic and cultural links between the two 
sides.
57
 Fourth, and most unfortunately, there is deeper division 
inside Taiwan as compared with the ‗90s.58 I would venture to say 
that Taiwan‘s internal strife is much worse than what is going on in 
 
 52. Haixia Liangan Jingji Hezuo Jiagou Xieyi ( 海 峽 兩 岸 經 濟 合 作 架 構 協 議 / 
海峡两岸经济合作框架协议 ) [Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement], art. 16(2), 
available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-06/29/content_1640769.htm [hereinafter ECFA].   
 53. Kwei-Bo Huang, supra note 49, at 8.  
 54. Jerome A. Cohen & Yu-Jie Chen, Partners on Crime, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 6, 
2011, at A13, available at http://www.usasialaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/20110706-
NEWS_INSIGHT.pdf.  
 55. China‘s 1992 GDP was $488 billion compared to Taiwan‘s 1992 GDP of $220 billion. 
World Economic Outlook Database, supra note 43.  
 56. The GDP‘s of the provinces are $665 billion, $574 billion, and $596 billion, respectively. 
Comparing Chinese Provinces with Countries: All the Parities in China, ECONOMIST, 
http://www.economist.com/content/all_parities_china (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
 57.  E.g., ECFA, supra note 52. 
 58. SU CHI, supra note 1, 278–79 (describing the current ―polarization of public opinion in 
Taiwan‖ regarding China).  
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the States. And fifth, there is greater difficulty in managing the hard 
and soft dimensions simultaneously.  
What about the future prospect of the cross-strait relations? The 
era of ―a tail wagging two dogs‖ is probably gone forever. I think 
Taiwan‘s power to wag the dogs is diminishing, because both the dog 
and the tail are changing. How is the dog, the PRC, changing beyond 
2012? Let me just put forward this thesis: I think inside China three 
processes are occurring at this moment, even though they are still at 
the stage of quantitative change, not yet qualitative change. 
The first process is power transition and dispersion inside China. 
We all know that this year we are going to have an election in Taiwan 
and an election in the United States. This year in China there is also 
power transition, from Mr. Hu Jintao to Mr. Xi Jinping.59 Previous 
Chinese leaders such as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were both 
selected, but Xi Jinping was not selected; he was elected. He was 
elected not by the people for sure, and not by the small circle of nine 
standing members of the Politburo, but by what I call the equivalent 
of the Roman Senate. More than four hundred people, mostly the 
Central Committee members and alternate members elected Mr. Xi 
Jinping and other new leaders into the top positions. This means his 
power base is different. In the future, Mr. Xi Jinping and his 
colleagues will have to constantly look at these four hundred people, 
not at the guy at the top or behind. That is qualitative change, and that 
is occurring. It is not democracy yet, but it is different than before. 
Second, economically, as evidenced by the Twelfth Five-year 
Plan, Chinese leadership is trying to transform the economy from 
export-based to consumption based.60 This is a big challenge and they 
have never done this before. While this must be terrifying the 
Chinese leadership, they have to do it because the export market 
outside China is shrinking.61 In the process of this transformation, 
China will appear increasingly not only as a world factory, which 
China has been so far, but China will appear increasingly as a market 
while still a factory. China‘s future influence will be derived from 
this new role—as a market. China is now just about the largest 
 
 59. Kwei-Bo Huang, supra note 49, at 24.  
 60. Key Targets of China’s 12th Five Year Plan, XINHUA GEN. NEWS SERV., Mar. 5, 2011, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/05/c_13762230.htm.  
 61. See, e.g., China Manufacturing Data Show Risk of Deeper Slowdown on Exports: 
Economy, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 12, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-22/china-pmi-
may-shrink-for-4th-month-survey.html (reporting that a ―measure of export orders fell to an eight-
month low‖). 
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trading partner to everybody surrounding it—from Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and other Southeast Asian 
countries.62 This role is going to be greater in the future. This sea 
change for China is very hard to do but the process is beginning.  
The third internal process of change is greater popular demand 
for participation. I agreed with Professor Cohen and Professor Sun 
this morning when you mentioned entrepreneurship and 
individualistic tendencies. Deep down the Chinese are very 
individualistic. So-called collectivism exists only on the surface. I 
used to study the Soviet Union in graduate schools in the United 
States, and by comparison, Russia and the Soviet Union truly 
exemplify collectivism. That huge land was ruled from Kiev for two 
hundred years, and then for centuries everything flew from 
Moscow—including politics, culture, economics, cuisine, etc. But in 
China you see different capitals, dialects, songs, and cuisines.63 In 
fact, through the dynasties and until the establishment of the Republic 
in 1912, China never had a single currency country-wide.  
Also about this new demand for participation, in the future, there 
will be a proliferation of new actors. As people-to-people exchanges 
intensify, new bureaucracies inside China will leap into the Taiwan 
policy-making processes; new corporations and new groups will 
strive to make their weight felt. Even some individuals who came out 
of nowhere would and could splash onto the overall relationship. For 
instance, Mr. Chen Guangbiao is a filthy rich guy and he just loves to 
play Santa Claus.64 But unlike other rich people with a big heart who 
usually donate money to charity groups, Mr. Chen likes to go out on 
 
 62. Background Note: South Korea, U.S. DEP‘T STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/ 
2800.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2012) (noting that China is South Korea‘s leading trading partner); 
Saibal Dasgupta, China Becomes Japan’s Biggest Trading Partner Surpassing US, TIMES OF 
INDIA, Aug. 25, 2009, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-25/china/28187935_1_ 
bilateral-trade-total-trade-volume-jetro; Background Note: Taiwan, U.S. DEP‘T STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35855.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2012) (noting the same 
regarding Taiwan); Xu Lingui, China to Become 2nd Largest Trade Partner of Philippines as 
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the streets and dole out cash directly to the people.65  During the 
Chinese New Year in February 2011 he decided to do it in Taiwan.66 
That infuriated a lot of people there. This kind of individual behavior, 
totally unsanctioned by officials, could disturb cross-strait relations in 
the years to come. 
These three processes could combine to make China very 
different. It is difficult to imagine this new China would allow itself 
to be wagged by a much weaker Taiwan.  
Taiwan must learn to deal with a multitude of highly diversified 
actors with complex or even conflicting agendas. This is a daunting 
challenge. 
If the dog is changing, so is the tail. Taiwan is changing in 
several ways. First of all, China‘s role vis-à-vis Taiwan will loom 
larger than before. China will be at once a bigger opportunity and a 
bigger threat. That is the reality we have to live with. Second, 
unfortunately, the Blue and Green camps inside Taiwan are both 
weak and internally divided.67  Even though I‘m not an expert in 
elections, I do not think President Ma, the incumbent, or either of the 
two challengers, Dr. Tsai Inwen and Dr. James Soong, could win 
with a comfortable margin in the January 2012 election.
68
 In fact, the 
margin would be so small that none would be able to push a program 
as strongly as President Ma did over the past three years. In other 
words, Taiwan could be a weaker tail in the future. 
Thirdly, as cross-strait relations intensify, the Taiwanese people 
feel more ambivalent toward China. That is to say, intimate cross-
strait economic and cultural integration entails greater benefits, but at 
the same time engenders greater wariness inside Taiwan. This has to 
do with the human rights problems in China, different ideologies, 
different thinking, and different systems of government. Some people 
in the West tend to think that Taiwan is now sliding into the orbit of 
the PRC. I totally disagree. I think that is a very unfortunate 
misreading of the situation. People do not live by bread alone.  
On the one hand, we need the bread. We need to do business 
together. But at the same time, we are aware of the differences. So, 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. SU CHI, supra note 1, at 279.  
 68.  On January 14, 2012, President Ma was reelected with 51.6% of the vote, Ms. Tsai won 
45.6%, and Mr. Soong won 2.8%. Andrew Jacobs, President of Taiwan is Re-elected, a Result 
That is Likely to Please China, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, at A6. 
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we just have to manage the dialectics—the opportunity and threat at 
the same time. President Ma‘s strategy, which I also support, is to 
maximize the opportunity and minimize the threat. Of course, that is 
easier said than done, but somehow we have to try.  
From the foregoing analysis, my conclusion is that the era of ―a 
tail wagging two dogs‖ is probably over. We are approaching a new 
turning point, if not an era. I don‘t know if it will be a new era or not, 
but at least a turning point is coming up. Partly it will depend on who 
is going to win the next election. 
So as you can see, I am very apprehensive about Taiwan being 
weakened to the extent that it cannot handle the complexities of 
cross-strait relations anymore, particularly in view of its internal 
division. This is why after some brainstorming, I have decided to set 
up a new think tank in Taiwan. It is a bipartisan think tank, the first 
of its kind in Taiwan. It is not financed by the government or a 
political party. It‘s called Taipei Forum. 69  And I have convinced 
some Democratic Progressive Party members to work together with 
me. We hope that we could at least forge some degree of internal 
consensus to prepare for the next moves by the ―new dog.‖ And we 
are going to launch the think tank sometime after the election. 
In the long run though, I like to think (and I hope I am right) that 
Taiwan could exert our role as a democracy. As the Chinese people 
are individualistic, enterprising, and free-minded, they can accept 
democracy as many others have, even though the eventual system of 
government may be different from the Western model of liberal 
democracy. I think when they have collected enough money in their 
pockets, when they have enjoyed inner freedom, they will want to 
have a say in decision making to protect their money. They will want 
to have the power to express their ideas freely. Warts and all, Taiwan 
could be a model. But the pre-condition for Taiwan to play that role 
is to not go for de jure independence. If Taiwan were seen as going 
toward de jure independence, China‘s eyes would be closed toward 
Taiwan‘s democracy. They would only see that as a threat to their 
nationalism. Additionally, Taiwan has to govern itself well to make 
itself attractive. This is not easy, especially compared to China‘s 
economic performance in the last thirty years. But in the long run, I 
am hopeful that Taiwan will continue to play a positive role. We may 
not wag the dogs, but we will interact with the dogs positively, 
including our relations with the United States.  
 
69. See TAIPEI FORUM, http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw (last visited Apr. 12, 2012).  
